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ABSTRACT
In this wide-ranging interview, the well-known Earth System scientist Professor
Will Steffen introduces and discusses the influential planetary boundaries (PB)
framework, the potential for a Hothouse Earth pathway and the relevance of
the Anthropocene concept. He elaborates on the role of emergence,







Will Steffen is Emeritus Professor at the Fenner School of Environment and Society, the Australian
National University (ANU), Canberra. Professor Steffen is an Earth System scientist, known for his
advocacy, with Paul Crutzen, of the concept of the Anthropocene and for his collaborative workwith
Johan Rockström, Tim Lenton, Katherine Richardson andmany others, which explores the complex
interrelations and dependencies of humans with their environment. In 2009 Steffen, Rockström and
a team of researchers published a ‘planetary boundaries’ framework in Nature and their work has
beenwidely cited and used (informing, for example, the Rio+20 summits’work on sustainable devel-
opment). In addition, Steffen has published numerous other papers over the years and was a contri-
buting author or reviewer of five IPCC reports. He has held a series of significant academic and policy
advice positions and been the recipient of numerous honours. He is currently honorary professor at
Copenhagen University, a senior fellow at the Stockholm Resilience Centre, a Fellow at the Beijer
Institute of Ecological Economics, also in Stockholm, former chair of the Australian Government’s
Antarctic Science Advisory Committee and sits on the advisory committee of the APEC Climate
Centre. Following the dissolution of theAustralianClimateCommission in 2013 by then PrimeMin-
ister TonyAbbott, Steffen and several of his fellow commissioners crowdfunded an independent Cli-
mate Council and he remains a Councillor. He is currently working on the ERC ‘Earth Resilience in
the Anthropocene’ project, jointly coordinated at the Stockholm Resilience Centre and the Potsdam
Institute for Climate Impact Research. He holds a BSc from theUniversity ofMissouri (1970), and an
MSc (1972) and PhD (1975) in chemistry, both from the University of Florida, as well as honorary
doctorate degrees from Stockholm University and the University of Canberra.1
The following interview with Professor Steffen was conducted by Professor Jamie Morgan for
Globalizations.
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Jamie Morgan (JM): After years of increasingly urgent warnings from natural scientists, eco-
logical economists and activists, it is now widely acknowledged that we have entered a period of
‘climate emergency’ and cumulative ecological breakdown. The Alliance of World Scientists is
now actively promoting the concepts and raising awareness and academics, politicians and the pub-
lic are increasingly familiar with related language and issues, but many are likely less familiar with
Earth System science and the role it plays.2 So, it might be useful to start with a brief explanation of
what an Earth System approach is, what you and your colleagues work focusses on and what a ‘pla-
netary boundaries’ framework entails.
Will Steffen (WS): Basically, the ‘Earth System’ refers to the interacting physical, chemical and
biological processes that operate across, and link, the atmosphere, cryosphere (ice), land, ocean and
lithosphere. These processes create ‘emergent properties’ – that is, properties and features of the
Earth System as a whole which arise from the interaction amongst these spheres. Global average
surface temperature is a good example – it is a property of the Earth System as a whole.
JM: Emergence is a concept that is probably most familiar to philosophically inclined readers
(via the work of John Stuart Mill, Jaegwon Kim, etc. and most especially issues in philosophy of
mind and the nature of consciousness; see O’Conner, 2020). But, clearly, it refers to any type of
system in so far as its properties do not reduce to those of its parts in isolation.
WS: The human body is a good analogy for the Earth System. Although we are all made of
individual parts – bones, skin, muscle, etc. and contain organs that carry out specific functions –
heart, lungs, liver, brain, etc. – we are one single, integrated organism with properties at the level
of the entire human. Also, we have intangible features like feelings and emotions which arise
from complex interactions within our bodies and between our bodies and the external world.
So, in that analogy, the Earth System, too, has intangible, emergent properties that characterize
the system as a whole.
In fact, the Earth System exists in well-defined states, the most recent of which is the Holocene,
an 11,700-year epoch in the Geologic Time Scale. In terms of an Earth System framework, the
Holocene refers to a well-defined, stable state of the system, with a stable climate system, well-
defined patterns of atmospheric and ocean circulation, and stable distribution of biomes around
the planet. It is in this stable Holocene state that humanity has been able to expand and thrive.
JM: And the planetary boundaries (PB) framework?
WS: The planetary boundaries is a framework designed to assess what is required to maintain
the Earth System in a stable Holocene-like state. We defined the state of the Earth System based
on nine processes or features – such as climate stability, biosphere integrity, the water cycle,
land-cover change and so on.3 For each process, we have a control variable which measures the
level of human perturbation and a response variable that measures the changes in the Earth System
as a result of this pressure. Our present estimate is that four of the nine boundaries have been trans-
gressed, including the two key ones of climate stability and biosphere integrity. This assessment is
consistent with the scientific evidence showing that the Earth System has already left the Holocene
and has entered the Anthropocene, a proposed new epoch in Earth history.4
At present, my work is focussed on the development of scenarios of potential future trajectories
of the Earth System, based on a synthesis of modelling studies, observations, process studies and
palaeo records. The ultimate question is when could the Earth System be pushed onto an irrevers-
ible trajectory towards a much hotter state – Hothouse Earth – and how close are we to pushing it
onto that trajectory.5
JM: And as I understand it you have built into your boundary framework a degree of prudential
leeway to ensure that the system stays some (‘safe’) distance from any given tipping point? For
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example, for the category of ‘Climate Change’ in terms of Earth System processes, you use 350 parts
per million (ppm) by volume atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration as a proposed boundary.
In the 2009 Nature paper (Rockström et al., 2009) you noted the current level was 387 ppm and the
pre-industrial level 280 ppm. The UK Met Office is forecasting a level varying around 417 ppm for
2021–2.29 ppm higher than 2020, 30 ppm higher than your 2009 figure and around 50% higher
than the pre-industrial level.6 Moreover, according to the UK Met Office, the measurements indi-
cate it took around 200 years for the ppm to increase by 25% but just the last 30 for it to approach
50%. So, the direction of travel does not seem to have changed in this case, quite the reverse. Is the
same true of all the ‘parameters’ you use? In the 2009 paper, three of the planetary boundaries had
been ‘overstepped’ …
WS: When we first developed the planetary boundaries framework, we agreed that we should
apply the precautionary principle. This meant that when we proposed where a boundary might
lie, we wanted to make sure that the ‘safe operating space’, that is, the ‘planetary space’ where
the control variables for all of the boundary processes are indeed below the boundary itself is indeed
safe. By ‘safe’ here, we mean that there is very little risk that the Earth System will move towards
less-stable conditions driven by its own internal feedbacks. That is, the Earth System will be stable
and remain in Holocene-like conditions.
In the 2015 update of the planetary boundaries framework, we introduced the idea of a ‘zone of
uncertainty’ to account that there are indeed large uncertainties about where the boundary should
be placed, given gaps in scientific understanding as well as intrinsic variability in Earth System
dynamics. The boundary itself was placed at the lower end of the zone of uncertainty, based on
our assessment that we would be safe if the control variable was placed below that level. However,
as the name indicates, the zone of uncertainty is an area within which we don’t know whether the
Earth System will be safe or stable, or whether we may have triggered a tipping point or driven an
unacceptable level of change to the particular Earth System process. Beyond the zone of uncer-
tainty, there is a very high risk of large, potentially irreversible and often abrupt changes to
Earth System process. That would indeed be dangerous planetary territory. So staying within the
boundary itself, and not entering the zone of uncertainty, is what is required to remain within
the Earth System’s ‘safe operating space’.
The climate planetary boundary is a good example of how this system works. We set the bound-
ary at an atmospheric CO2 concentration of 350 ppm. Both observations and model simulations
show that such a boundary would cap temperature rise at much less than 1°C, and the Earth System
would remain stable at that level. We set the zone of uncertainty at 350–450 ppm CO2. The idea is
that the risks of climate impacts and of triggering a trajectory of the Earth System away from Holo-
cene conditions increases as the CO2 concentration rises. Observations bear this out. At over
410 ppm, we are already experiencing increases in the frequency and severity of several damaging
extreme weather events – extreme heat, drought, intense rainfall, wildfires, tropical cyclones. In
addition, several tipping points in the Earth System that could drive it towards hotter conditions,
even without any further human forcing, are becoming active. These include loss of Arctic sea ice,
melting of Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets, drought and fires in the Amazon forest, melt-
ing of Siberian permafrost, and slowdown of the Atlantic Ocean circulation.
In general, most of the control variables for the boundaries are moving away from the safe
operating space, or, if they were within, are moving closer to the boundary itself. An exception
to this trend is atmospheric ozone depletion, where the banning of CFCs had led to a stabiliz-
ation of ozone levels with a good prospect of increasing ozone concentration over the southern
hemisphere polar regions over the coming decades. For all of the other boundaries, however, the
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control variable is moving in the wrong direction. When the next major update of the PB frame-
work is published, hopefully later in 2021, it is likely that at least six of the nine boundaries will
be transgressed.
JM: Interesting, reference to the precautionary principle raises a whole set of issues regarding the
nature of objectivity and how others interpret and use evidence, including that drawn from your
own work. As I am sure you are aware, Article 3 (3) of the 1992 United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is:
The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate
change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into
account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure
global benefits at the lowest possible cost. To achieve this, such policies and measures should take into
account different socio-economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all relevant sources, sinks and
reservoirs of greenhouse gases and adaptation, and comprise all economic sectors. Efforts to address
climate change may be carried out cooperatively by interested Parties. (UNFCCC, 1992, p. 4 [emphasis
added])
Though well-intentioned perhaps, this places prudential action in the context of economic systems
and thus opens up policy choices and timing to a whole set of additional considerations that have
seemingly affected if and when to address changes to the different control variables your work uses
– cost effectiveness, benefits (to who and where?), etc. Do you worry about the misuse and misin-
terpretation of your work and your colleagues work?
WS: Yes, misrepresentation is indeed a problem. But I think we need to differentiate misrepre-
sentation by those who are using the science and some misrepresentation within the scientific com-
munity itself. As an example, there has certainly been misrepresentation of the planetary
boundaries framework, and also some possible misuse, at both levels.
The most prominent case of misinterpretation – an apparently deliberate misinterpretation – is
the claim by some critics within the scientific community that not all boundary processes have well-
defined thresholds or tipping points. That is, there has been a conflation of a boundary with a tip-
ping point. We were very clear that not all boundary processes had tipping points, and even if a
boundary process had a tipping point, the boundary itself would be set well upstream of the tipping
point. Some critics attempted to discredit the framework by arguing that not all boundary processes
had tipping points, despite the fact that we explicitly pointed out that some processes were more
gradual, with no discernible tipping point, but nevertheless pushing the process too far would
move the Earth System out of Holocene conditions.
Potential misuse, in my view, can occur when the planetary boundary framework is applied to
uses or situations for which it was not designed. This type of misuse occurs in the user community,
rather than in the scientific community itself. The primary issue here is the framework is explicitly
designed to operate at the global level. This has not stopped the ‘down-scaling’ of the framework to
be applied at the level of individual countries or corporations or other economic entities. The pro-
blem here is that not all boundary processes scale linearly as one goes down from the global to smal-
ler scales, so setting the portion of the safe operating space that country X, for example, can ‘use’ is
fraught with many difficulties. In terms of corporations, trying to match supply chains with the pla-
netary boundary framework can quickly become extremely difficult to implement.
JM: There is an important issue here that a great deal of business school work on ‘sustainable
development’ tends to neglect. While it is potentially constructive for each and every significant
entity to have ‘sustainable development’ policies, whether in fact an activity is ‘sustainable’ is not
4 W. STEFFEN AND J. MORGAN
set at the level of that entity, but of the totality of them in so far as the level of activity and its con-
sequences are within the tolerance of systems. Of course, one might think that enough entities
undertaking change might mean that change is sufficient to place the aggregate within that toler-
ance and this seems, for example, to be basic to the ‘bottom up’ approach adopted for the nationally
determined contributions (NDCs) of the Paris Agreement. Your planetary boundaries framework
is more broadly based than the main focus on emissions and temperature in Paris Article 2 (1a)
(UN, 2015). What scope do you see for that broader based approach to inform the implementation
of the Paris Agreement, given that, as you say, the situation seems to have moved from 3 to 4 and
perhaps 6 Earth System processes exceeding boundaries – and perhaps you might mention which
these others are and what their significance might be?
WS: The two additional boundaries that probably have been transgressed are ocean acidification
and freshwater use. In the 2015 assessment of the PBs, ocean acidification was virtually on the
boundary itself. Since then, emissions of CO2 have continued to increase, with the oceans absorbing
about 25% of these emissions, thus causing ocean acidification to increase, most likely beyond its
boundary value. The other PB that is likely to have been transgressed now is freshwater use. It con-
tinues to increase and, along with that issue, we are re-examining where that boundary should be
set based on new analyses in the peer-reviewed literature. That is a work-in-progress and we hope
to have an update later in the year.
The issue of novel entities will also be updated in our 2021 analysis. At present, there is no
suggested boundary. This is an extremely complex process to deal with, starting with the definition
of novel entities themselves. Much of the focus so far has been on chemical pollutants, and we are
using that as a model for how one sets boundaries for such substances. Late in 2020, we ran a work-
shop bringing together experts on chemical pollutants and their impact on the environment. An
interesting suggestion, which is getting quite a bit of support, is that the boundary for chemical pol-
lution should be set at zero. As the name indicates, a ‘novel entity’ is something entirely new to the
Earth System so the system has no experience in dealing with or metabolizing such materials. This
makes sense from a scientific perspective, but it would be very confronting for the chemicals indus-
try. In essence, a PB set at zero for chemical pollution would mean that we would have to develop
circular economies and industrial systems, where there are no pollutants or effluents released to the
environment. They are all captured and re-used.
JM: Yes, this seems likely to be controversial – not because it is unreasonable, but because of the
ingrained problems of industrial processes and uses.7 Over the last thirty years, plastics producers,
for example, have placed considerable resources into convincing the public that recycling has been
relatively effective in addressing some of the problems of plastics production and use – yet, as I am
sure you know, only a small fraction of plastics are recyclable and are recycled and of these a great
proportion are ‘down-cycled’ rather than ‘closed-loop’ (a bottle becomes something else rather than
a bottle stays a bottle). The level of plastics in our environment, especially micro-plastics, is, of
course, now a matter of growing concern and awareness. But, given this is something readers prob-
ably already know something about it might be worth illustrating a slightly different issue here in
order to reinforce understanding of some of the key issues your PB approach highlights. The idea of
feedback seems extremely important, would it be possible to provide an example of a feedback pro-
cess? Moreover, complexity seems to be an important facet of the Earth System and uncertainty
seems to be a key issue arising from interactions which influence feedbacks, so perhaps you
might comment on this too. Clearly, uncertainty should not be taken as grounds for complacency,
as though it amounted to ‘we don’t know, so there is no need for concern’ – this is intrinsic to the
adequacy of a precautionary principle isn’t it?
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WS: You’ve certainly raised some important issues here. First, the fact that the Earth System is a
complex system is very important but also widely misunderstood. Here, the term ‘complex system’
is used in a technical sense and not simply to mean a system that is highly complicated with many
‘moving parts’. Rather, complex systems are systems that typically exist in well-defined states that
are stable and resilient to external forcing agents or internal dynamics. Their resilience is often built
around ‘negative’, or dampening, feedback processes that act to maintain the system in its existing
stable state. For example, over half of the human emissions of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere are
absorbed by the ocean and land, thus reducing the amount that remains in the atmosphere and
acting to maintain the climate in a stable state. In general, the Holocene – the most recent
11,700-year epoch in Earth history – was a stable, resilient state of the Earth System because of
these intrinsic negative feedbacks.
However, once complex systems are forced too far away from their stability domains and their
dampening feedback mechanisms are overwhelmed, they can move rapidly and irreversibly
towards a new state as ‘positive’ (reinforcing) feedback mechanisms take over. This is the risk
that we currently face with the accelerating trajectory of the Earth System away from the Holocene.
At present, dampening feedbacks still dominate the overall behaviour of the system, but positive
feedbacks are being activated. These include melting permafrost, increasing drought and fire in
the Amazon rainforest, and a slowing of the Atlantic Ocean circulation.
The second important issue you’ve raised above is how to deal with uncertainty. We know, with
a high degree of certainty, that many positive feedback processes exist, but we don’t know – with a
high degree of certainty – where the tipping points for these processes might lie. That is, where is
the level of forcing (e.g. temperature rise) beyond which permafrost melt becomes self-reinforcing
and thus unstoppable? Even more uncertainty surrounds the interactions among these feedback
processes, interactions that could lead to a global tipping cascade. In effect, this is the process
that would drive the Earth System from one stable state – the Holocene – into another stable,
but much hotter, state, sometimes called ‘Hothouse Earth’. Large uncertainties remain regarding
the point at which such a global tipping cascade, if it exists, could be initiated. So this is the ultimate
challenge for humanity in terms of dealing with the uncertainty-complacency issue, and in applying
the precautionary principle. And, of course, the planetary boundary framework is designed to err
on the side of safety. That is, if the boundaries are respected, we argue that there is only a very low
probability of initiating a tipping cascade.
JM: Coming back to the core focus of Paris via Article 2 (1a), all of this seems to suggest that
climate and ecological breakdown is a more complex set of issues than Paris alone can and does
address.
WS: Yes, it certainly is. We use the term ‘biosphere degradation’ for ecological breakdown, and
give it core boundary status along with climate change. Core PBs, according to our definition, can
change the state of the Earth System on their own. This is clear for climate change. But in the past,
major changes to the biosphere have also marked different states of the Earth System as a whole,
and many of them have acted as feedback processes that have pushed the Earth System from
one state to another. Examples include mass extinction events and the evolution of new life
forms. Today there are multiple threats to the biosphere, including the potential for the sixth
mass extinction event in Earth’s history.
There have been several assessments of how humanity is changing the biosphere now, irrespec-
tive of climate change. For example, the big international assessment effort called IPBES (Intergo-
vernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services) in 2019 came up with
a number of overarching conclusions on human-driven degradation of the biosphere. Three of the
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most prominent ones are: (i) Nature is declining globally at rates unprecedented in human history;
(ii) around one million animal and plant species are now threatened with extinction, many within
decades, (iii) the web of life on Earth is getting smaller and increasingly frayed.8
Palaeo-botanist Mark Williams and his collaborators have examined human degradation of the
biosphere in a very long-term perspective and suggest that our impact on the biosphere could rep-
resent the third major stage in the evolution of the biosphere in Earth history. They suggest four
criteria: (i) global homogenization of flora and fauna; (ii) humans commandeering 25%–40% of
the net primary productivity (NPP) of the biosphere and the mining of fossil NPP (fossil fuels);
(iii) human-directed evolution of other species; and (iv) increasing interaction of the biosphere
and the technosphere (e.g. chemical pollutants).
Although there are certainly some connections between these changes to the biosphere and cli-
mate change, often through the carbon cycle, it is absolutely clear that dealing with these profound
changes to the biosphere are well beyond the remit of the Paris Accord.
JM: Your comments on degradation, mass extinctions, etc. all speak to issues of conditions and
cause and thus evoke the concept of an ‘Anthropocene’, in so far as our species is not a mere bystan-
der or observer in events but is, rather, the prime mover in them. But before we come to that, given
we have raised the issue of Paris, and you had some role in the 2018 IPCC Global Warming of 1.5°C
report (IPCC, 2018), I am curious as to your opinion on its subsequent reception. On the one hand,
it has precipitated a significant increase in awareness of the need to urgently tackle climate change
and GHG emissions (targets for 2030, net-zero by mid-century, the UN ‘Race to Zero campaign,
etc.).9 On the other hand, there was considerable wrangling regarding what status to give to the
report (bearing in mind it had been invited/commissioned) within the COP process – at COP
24 in Katowice the US, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Kuwait objected to the phrase ‘welcomes the
report’ and preferred ‘noted’. Did you find this ‘disappointing’?
WS: The reception to the IPCC SR1.5 report was generally very good, despite a few countries
apparently not wanting to ‘welcome’ it. The report has indeed supported the growing calls for
much more urgent action on climate change and has also focussed on near-term action with
interim emission reduction targets for 2030 becoming much more prominent. The report also pro-
vides a stark assessment of the large increase in risks and impacts that will occur at 2°C of warming
compared to 1.5°C. A decade or so ago, a 2°C target was thought to be adequate or even ‘safe’, but
the IPCC SR1.5 report seriously challenged that assumption.10 In addition to the urgency message,
the SR1.5 report also hammered home the message that the more we learn about climate change,
the riskier it looks.
JM: This brings us to the Anthropocene. When did you and others start thinking about using
this term and what exactly do you mean by it?
WS: The term ‘Anthropocene’ was introduced by Paul Crutzen in February 2000 at a meeting of
the IGBP (International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme) Scientific Committee in Cuernavaca,
Mexico. Paul was becoming agitated at continuing references to the Holocene in our discussions
of impacts on the Earth System, and he finally interrupted the discussion and forcefully said that
we are no longer in the Holocene; we are in the… Anthropocene. He coined the term at just
that moment.
The term ‘Anthropocene’ had two distinct meanings from the beginning. One was clearly based
on the Geologic Time Scale, in which the geological history of Earth is divided into time units –
eras, periods, epochs and so on. The Anthropocene was suggested as a new epoch to terminate
the Holocene, based on the mass of evidence that was being gathered by the IGBP and other
research efforts. The second – closely related – meaning was that the Earth System has left the
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11,700-year relatively stable Holocene state and was now in a rapid trajectory away from the Holo-
cene into significantly new and different conditions. The term Anthropocene also implied that this
trajectory away from the Holocene was not being driven by natural forces within or external to the
Earth System (e.g. volcanic eruptions, changes in solar intensity, meteorite strikes) but rather by the
activities of Homo sapiens. As the Anthropocene concept became more broadly known, its
interpretations multiplied, primarily in terms of unpacking what aspects of the ‘human enterprise’
and what segments of the global human population were primarily responsible for the Anthropo-
cene. The start date for the Anthropocene is also an interesting topic for discussion, with the geo-
logic and Earth System science communities agreeing that the most appropriate start for the
Anthropocene is the mid-twentieth century.
JM: This raises a whole set of important issues for how one develops and applies the concept of
an Anthropocene and perhaps we could start to draw the interview to a close by inviting you to
comment on this? Early on you referred to measures of ‘human perturbation’ for each of the 9 pro-
cesses in the PB framework in relation to response variables. And as you say, there is a great deal of
unpacking to do in terms of the nature of human enterprise that underpins the concept of an
Anthropocene. Insofar as humans have become a primary influence on the Earth System this
evokes the subsequent questions, what human systems, what places, practices, organizations, and
policies are producing ‘human perturbation’? Some combination of answers to these questions
lead to the kinds of consequences the PB identifies. Clearly, the nature of explanations of
human systems bears on the adequacy of explanation of how our species has found itself in a period
of climate emergency and ecological breakdown, and as a corollary, this must have some bearing on
how we view the scope and adequacy of solutions, and conversely, it bears on where we might
expect to find impediments to adequate solutions – a subject that ranges across knowledge/theory
and its framing effects as well as its influence on research applications, politics and policy.11
Ecological economists, of course, are distinguished from other economists by their focus on
an economy as a set of material processes, involving thermodynamic consequences, entropy,
waste creation, and basic bio-physical modification of the world. This approach brings into ques-
tion standard economics, which focuses primarily on the exchange value of goods and services,
that, in turn, supports an idea of an economy as a circular flow of income, targeting continual
economic growth. The standard economic approach disembeds an economy and then, ‘environ-
mental economics’ tries to adapt standard economics to the real-world problems this has pro-
duced, by adding on environmental concerns as modifications to the core of the economics.
For an ecological economist, this is insufficient to address the generalized problem that
human systems are dependent on and consequential for a material world i.e. that there are limits
to what can be safely done.12 However, once this distinction has been made ecological economics
starts to divide as the political economy of causation comes to the fore and the problem of ‘what
is to be done?’ is evoked. There is, for example, work that modifies the concept of an Anthro-
pocene as a ‘Capitalocene’, there is renewed debate over limits to growth, but now in the context
of ‘green new deals’, there is scepticism regarding the kinds of integrated assessment models that
have dominated debate in environmental economics (the social cost of carbon approach), there
is scepticism regarding the influence that faith in solutions stemming from future technology,
etc. might have on the ‘net’ in net-zero (what it will mean in practice), there is a host of
work on ‘social ecological economics’, ‘postgrowth’ and ‘degrowth’, which argues that fundamen-
tal changes are required in the way society and economies are organized and motivated (and this
is different than just massive investment in infrastructure organized around a transition, since it
begs the question of, ‘from what and to what?’), etc.13
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I am not sure how familiar you are with this kind of work, so perhaps you might comment on
that. Clearly, the importance of your work is not reduced by any of these issues noted above, but
they do seem to have some bearing on the timing of an Anthropocene (the subjective aspects per-
haps), but more importantly on how we might move towards the ‘Alternative Stabilized Earth Path-
way’ your work draws attention to – one that avoids crossing thresholds that lock us into a
‘Hothouse Earth pathway’. And this seems especially so once one starts to think of the focus of
Paris as vital yet partial from a more holistic PB perspective…
WS: You’ve raised a number of very important issues above, and I’ll start with the last one first –
the timing of the Anthropocene. If we go back to the original sources of the Anthropocene concept
– basically Earth System science and geology/stratigraphy, we have two different criteria for deter-
mining the start of the Anthropocene epoch. The Earth System science definition is based on the
time at which the trajectory of the Earth System clearly left the 11,700-year stable Holocene epoch,
and there is a mass of evidence that points to the mid-twentieth century for that start date. Strati-
graphers examine changes in the Earth’s stratigraphic record – e.g. ice cores, tree rings, lake and
coastal sediments and so on. Can they see a clear line of demarcation where the indicator in the
core – isotopic signature, pollen record, nitrate concentration, etc. – clearly changes from one
level to another? Again, there is a mass of stratigraphic evidence that shows a break in the strati-
graphic record around the mid-twentieth century. Consistent with this bio-physical evidence, his-
torian John McNeill, in his landmark book Something New Under the Sun, has described the
changes in the human component of the Earth System – governance, technology, economies, inter-
national relations – that led to the explosion of human activity from the mid-twentieth century
onwards, a phenomenon he labelled the ‘Great Acceleration’.14
A very interesting point of discussion and debate is just which humans have been most respon-
sible for the Great Acceleration, and hence for driving the Earth System out of the Holocene. And
this question has led to some variants on the Anthropocene, such as the ‘Capitalocene’ and the
‘Manthropocene’. The basic point here is that not all humans have been equally responsible for
the Anthropocene. In our original analysis of the Anthropocene data, we had lumped all of human-
ity together as one whole. But in an update of the data to 2010, we divided humanity into three
groups – the OECD (wealthy) countries, the so-called BRICS emerging countries (Brazil, Russia,
India, China, South Africa) and all the others – the poorer countries. The outcome of this analysis
was striking. From 1950 to 2010, nearly all of the population growth was in the BRICS and devel-
oping countries, who accounted for about 80% of the global population, yet 74% of the world GDP,
and hence consumption, occurred in the OECD countries. That is, the data showed huge inequal-
ities within the human component of the Earth System. These data are from 2010, so the rapid rise
of China, for example, would probably change this analysis somewhat if it was taken to 2020.
Nevertheless, the analysis of the rapidly changing characteristics of the ‘human enterprise’ – if I
can call it that – are an important feature of the Anthropocene narrative.
So where is the Anthropocene going? Can we quickly change the trajectory of the Earth System
away from its current pathway towards Hothouse Earth and onto a Stabilized Earth pathway? There
is no clear answer to that question, but perhaps the various attempts to answer it can be grouped
into two very broad, contrasting approaches. One is that technology is the solution – switching to
renewable energy systems, smart grids, electricified transport systems, high-tech agriculture and so
on – will create a sustainable future. Economies can grow and we can become wealthier, but decou-
pling will reduce our imprint on the Earth System. The other broad pathway is that we require a
much deeper transformation, one that is based on a fundamental shift in core values – degrowth,
less consumptive lifestyles, from ‘wealth’ to ‘well-being’, living much simpler but more satisfying
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lives, reconnecting with the biosphere, and so on. As of yet, there is no clear answer to these ques-
tions, and opinions and debates continue. Probably the only sure thing we can say about the future
is that it hasn’t happened yet.
JM: Taking stock then, do you see grounds for optimism?
WS: I think we are at a critical point in human history. There are grounds for both optimism and
pessimism. The pessimism is fuelled by the power of the incumbents (e.g. the fossil fuel industry)
and the conservative political ideologies that hang on to power. Breaking this toxic power structure
can seem impossibly hard at times. On the other side of the coin, social tipping points are notor-
iously difficult to foresee and predict.
JM: And yet 2030 is fast approaching and 2050 is sooner than we like to think. We cannot, see-
mingly, afford to wait and must begin to provide answers and we need governments to begin to act
– to mobilize akin to ‘war-footing’, as it has been put.15 The rhetoric around COP26 makes much of
this urgency. Moreover, whatever uncertainty pertains, given we are talking about high impact and
irreversible processes there seems to be a policy asymmetry situation that the precautionary prin-
ciple implies, but politics does not always fully embrace: it is better to overrespond rather than
under since the consequences of underreaction are surely greater?
WS: But there appears to bemounting pressure acrossmany societies for fundamental change. This,
of course, gives one hope for the future. Forme, a critical question is timing. There are tipping points in
the Earth System and we could be approaching a planetary tipping point that could lead to Hothouse
Earth and a dismal future for humanity. So it is a race against time. Canwe transformour societies (and
ourselves) fast enough to avoid a Hothouse Earth future? That is the critical question, and nobody
knows the answer, but it will depend on us – the values that we hold and the choices that we make.
Notes




2. Note from JM: see Ripple et al. (2020, 2021) and “The Climate Emergency: 2020 in Review”: https://bit.
ly/3nk4QXt
3. Note from JM, the original full list of 9 Earth system processes each with a boundary, parameters,
measurement status and comparison to a pre-industrial level (phrased here in terms of foci for poten-
tially adverse effects) comprises: 1. Climate Change; 2. Rate of biodiversity loss; 3. Nitrogen cycle/Phos-
phorous cycle – jointly comprising the biogeochemical flow boundary; 4. Stratospheric ozone
depletion; 5. Ocean acidification; 6. Global freshwater use; 7. Change in land use; 8. Atmospheric aero-
sol loading; 9. Chemical pollution (Rockström et al., 2009, p. 473). For tipping points discussion see also
Lenton et al. (2008) and Lenton et al. (2019).
4. Note from JM: see, for example, Steffen et al. (2011); Robin and Steffen (2007); Crutzen and Steffen
(2003). See also Waters et al. (2015) and Zalasiewicz et al. (2010).
5. Note from JM: see, for example, Steffen et al. (2018, p 2016, 2015, 2005).
6. Note from JM: see the 10 year summary of UNEP emissions gap reports for the general trend increase
in global emissions (Christensen & Olhoff, 2019).
7. Note from JM: this, of course, does then raise the issue of what fully circular means and whether this is
possible (which is a different issue than whether it is unreasonable for corporations to address the pro-
blem of pollutants in good faith).
8. Note from JM: see IPBES (2019), note also there is considerable debate regarding the use of standard
economic theory to provide commensurable values as the basis of policies to protect, preserve and use
ecosystem ‘services’, as the recent UK Dasgupta Report indicates.
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9. Note from JM: Visit Race to Zero at: https://unfccc.int/climate-action/race-to-zero-campaign
And for the Climate Ambition Alliance see: https://cop25.mma.gob.cl/en/climate-ambition-
alliance/
10. Note from JM: moreover, (and noting Professor Steffen’s previous comments on the climate planetary
boundary) in the ‘Trajectories of the Earth System’ paper, Steffen and colleagues suggest that Paris cli-
mate targets may be insufficient to prevent a Hothouse Earth pathway: “This analysis implies that, even
if the Paris Accord target of a 1.5°C to 2.0°C rise in temperature is met, we cannot exclude the risk that a
cascade of feedbacks could push the Earth System irreversibly into a ‘Hothouse Earth pathway. The
challenge that humanity faces is to create a “Stabilized Earth” pathway that steers the Earth System
away from its current trajectory toward the threshold beyond which is Hothouse Earth. The human
created Stabilized Earth pathway leads to a basin of attraction that is not likely to exist in the Earth Sys-
tem’s stability landscape without human stewardship to create and maintain it. Creating such a pathway
and basin of attraction requires a fundamental change in the role of humans on the planet.” (Steffen
et al., 2018, p. 3). For similar concerns see Hansen et al. (2017); Bradshaw et al. (2021).
11. Note from JM: this is the subject matter of many of the contributions to the original special issue of
Globalizations. See the introduction, Gills and Morgan (2020b). See also Lamb et al. (2020); Røpke
(2020); Oreskes and Conway (2010).
12. Note from JM: compare Daly (1997) and Nordhaus (1991).
13. Note from JM: for indicative range see, for example, Hickel and Kallis (2020); Parrique et al. (2019);
Dyke et al. (2021); O’Neill et al. (2018); Moore (2015); Asefi-Najafabady et al. (2020); Keen (2020);
Spash (2020); Gills and Morgan (2020a).
14. Note from JM: see McNeill (2001).
15. Note from JM: see, for example, Newell and Simms (2020) on ‘just transition’ and also some of the
essays in the edited collection Fullbrook and Morgan (2019).
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